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Political parties are important actors in domestic climate politics. What drives variation in 
parties’ climate policy preferences? To contribute to a growing literature on the party politics 
of climate change, we focus on the roles of public opinion, party competition, and parties’ 
traditional policy preferences in shaping parties’ climate policy preferences in Denmark and 
Ireland. In case studies that draw on in-depth interviews with policy practitioners, we show 
how parties respond to public opinion, accommodate issue-owners, and are powerfully 
constrained and enabled by their existing preferences. This shows how parties respond to public 
opinion, accommodate issue-owners, and are powerfully constrained and enabled by their 
existing preferences. These mechanisms also help to explain different responses on climate 
policy across the left-right spectrum. Competition between mainstream parties is particularly 
powerful, but can constrain as much as it enables ‘greener’ climate policy preferences. While 
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climate change may be a distinctive problem, the party politics of climate change features 
similar incentives and constraints as other domains. 
 







Parties play an important role in structuring and channelling the politics of climate change 
(Båtstrand 2014, 2015, Marcinkiewicz and Tosun 2015, Carter et al. 2018, Farstad 2018). They 
influence public attitudes (Brulle et al. 2012, Guber 2013, Sohlberg 2016) and government 
policy outputs and outcomes (Jensen and Spoon 2011, Birchall 2014). Party polarization on 
climate change raises the stakes of political competition on climate policy; it influences threat 
perceptions and public behaviour, and it is generally understood to lead to greater climate 
policy delay and less effective, ambitious, or consistent climate policy (Christoff and Eckersley 
2011, pp.442–443, Farstad 2016, p.35, Sohlberg 2016; see also Farstad 2019 – this volume). 
What drives variation in parties’ climate policy preferences? This study examines the party 
politics of climate change in Denmark and Ireland over the past two decades, focusing on the 
roles of public opinion on climate change, party competition, and intra-party factors, especially 
parties’ other, pre-existing policy preferences. Further, it investigates their role in producing 
the relationship between left-right preferences and climate policy preferences that has been 
observed in several studies (e.g., De Blasio and Sorice 2013, Carter et al. 2018, p.736, Farstad 
2018).  
Using case study methods, including in-depth interviews with climate policy practitioners, it 
finds evidence that each of these three factors plays a role in parties’ responses to climate 
change. Low public concern about climate change is viewed as a considerable constraint on 
the development of parties’ climate policy preferences, while increased concern provides 
opportunities for parties to raise its salience and to take stronger climate policy positions. 
Electorally successful issue-owners provoke accommodative behaviour from other parties, 
especially those close to them in political space, while competition between larger parties on 
climate change seems to be a powerful driver of climate policy preferences, but not necessarily 
towards ‘greener’ preferences. Existing party policy preferences on traditional policy issues 
function as an important constraint on – and sometimes an enabler of – parties’ climate policy 
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preferences. They have had a particularly constraining effect on the preferences of right-of-
centre parties.  
We proceed as follows. First, we clarify some key concepts and outlines theory and existing 
knowledge in relation to the three causal factors of interest. In the second section, we discuss 
case selection and other methodological choices, followed by two country studies and an 
analytical discussion. The study contributes to the growing evidence base concerning the 
determinants of party preferences on climate change and its findings regarding the roles of 
traditional party preferences may have implications for other ‘new’ issues. It highlights that, 
notwithstanding climate policy’s distinctiveness, the drivers of party preferences on climate 
policy have much in common with party politics in other domains. 
 
Drivers of parties’ climate policy preferences 
A climate change mitigation policy is ‘a human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance 
the sinks of greenhouse gases’ (IPCC 2014, p.4); it plausibly encompasses ‘anti-climate’ 
policies too, which increase greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or reduce GHG sinks (Compston 
and Bailey 2013). Climate policies include carbon pricing, framework climate legislation, 
national strategies, amongst many others.  
Climate policy is a matter of environmental protection; in this respect, environmental policy is 
its ‘parent’ issue. However, not all environmental policies protect the climate: closing nuclear 
power stations, for example, protects aspects of the environment, but leads to increased GHG 
emissions in many contexts (Båtstrand 2014, p.933, Carter et al. 2018, p.734). Climate policies 
also encompass a wider set of subdomains than typical environmental policies. Thus, climate 
policy is both related to and distinct from environmental policy; this is also reflected in a recent 
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comparison of various measures of parties’ environmental and climate policy preferences 
(Carter et al. 2018, pp.737–739). 
Parties’ preferences vary, both in the emphasis they place on the climate policy (salience) and 
the position(s) that they adopt. In some contexts, increased salience goes hand-in-hand with 
the development of ‘greener’ positions on climate policy, but this is not always the case (cf. 
Carter and Jacobs 2014, Marcinkiewicz and Tosun 2015). Indeed, climate policy is often a 
positional, partisan issue (Farstad 2018, p.705); this further distinguishes it from environmental 
policy, which is often a valence issue. Differences in parties’ positions contribute to 
polarization on climate policy1; parties also contribute to variation in the systemic salience of 
climate policy. 
What drives variation in parties’ climate policy preferences and, thus, system-level structures 
of climate politics? There is considerable evidence that climate policy preferences are 
associated with traditional left-right policy preferences on economic and social issues (De 
Blasio and Sorice 2013, Carter et al. 2018, p.736, Farstad 2018), albeit with some exceptions 
(e.g., Poland: Marcinkiewicz and Tosun 2015). This association is also present in the case of 
environmental policy (Rohrschneider 1993, Dalton 2009, Jensen and Spoon 2011, Tosun 2011, 
Carter 2013). However, further research is required to specify the mechanisms underpinning 
the relationship between climate policy and left-right preferences (Farstad 2016, pp.249–250). 
We propose that there are at least three routes through which these mechanisms might operate, 
and that these mechanisms also offer general explanations for the development of parties’ 
climate policy preferences.  
                                                 
1 Polarization is understood here as positional differences between parties. The opposite of partisan polarization 
is consensus (Dalton 2008, p. 909). 
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First, parties seek votes and therefore public opinion can create an environment that is 
conducive to developing certain policy preferences (e.g., Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016). Carter 
and Jacobs’ (2014) account of British climate politics in the 2000s highlights the significance 
of increased public concern about climate change for the development of the main parties’ 
climate policy preferences. Spoon et al. (2014) find that parties emphasize environmental 
issues when public concern about those issues is high. Other suggestive evidence comes from 
the study of environmental policy in Denmark, where public concern about the environment 
has led to changes in government policy (Seeberg 2016). 
However, public opinion on climate change is unevenly distributed among voters: right-of-
centre ideals are negatively associated with belief in human-induced climate change and 
climate policy support, while left-of-centre ideals are positively associated with these 
dispositions (Hornsey et al. 2016). Moreover, larger, mainstream parties may be better able to 
respond to shifting voter concerns (Wagner and Meyer 2014, Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016, 
p.396). However, our knowledge is limited about the role of public opinion in shaping parties’ 
climate policy preferences (Marcinkiewicz and Tosun 2015, p.201) and in particular about the 
perceptions and motivations of party elites that produce them.  
Second, in developing their climate policy preferences, parties must take into account the 
behaviour of other parties. Issue-owners are a potential source of competition, but findings on 
their role are contradictory. Spoon et al. (2014) find that the success of Green parties forces 
other parties, especially those that are ideologically proximate to them, to accommodate their 
environmental policies. However, Abou-Chadi (2016) finds that the stronger Green parties 
deter other parties from raising the salience of environmental policy. In either case – and as 
indicated by Spoon et al.’s (2014) findings – it is likely that competition from parties with 
strong preferences on climate change creates unequal incentives for parties of the left and right: 
Green parties are with few exceptions from the left-of-centre (Carter 2013), while some of the 
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parties that have been most sceptical of climate science and policies are of the far right 
(Gemenis et al. 2012, Båtstrand 2014). 
Competition on climate policy may have a particularly strong effect when it comes from 
mainstream parties, although the evidence-base for this assumption is limited. The 
paradigmatic case of mainstream competition on climate policy is the UK’s brief ‘competitive 
consensus’ in the mid-late 2000s, which illustrated the particular importance for a centre-left 
party of not being outflanked by its centre-right rival (Carter and Jacobs 2014).  
Third, party preferences are proximately the product of intra-party factors and therefore we 
can expect preferences on a relatively new issue such as climate policy to be influenced by 
preferences on traditional issues (Meyer 2013). Broader preferences – on issues such as state 
intervention (e.g., public ownership, regulation, taxation), collectivism, changes to the policy 
status quo, and free markets – are often assumed to play a central role in explaining the 
relationship between left-right preferences and climate policy preferences (Båtstrand 2014, 
2015, pp.540–542, Farstad 2018). This assumption is supported by some limited empirical 
evidence on left-right differences from Norwegian manifestos in 2009 (Båtstrand 2014) and 
from nine conservative parties, whose preferences are constrained by their support for fossil 
fuel-producing industries (Båtstrand 2015). However, intra-party politics is arguably among 
the least-well understood factors that shape parties’ climate policy preferences.  
 
Case selection and data  
To examine the role of public opinion, party competition, and existing policy preferences in 
parties’ climate policy responses, including their role in the relationship between left-right and 
climate policy preferences, we focus on Denmark and Ireland (see Andersen and Nielsen 2016, 
Little and Torney 2017 for reviews). We gather data on the period from the mid-1990s to 2016. 
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This is long enough to observe individual parties over several election cycles, governmental 
configurations, and a variety of economic and international conditions.  
During this period, Ireland’s climate politics has been characterised by low salience and broad 
consensus (Little 2017a), while Denmark’s has been characterised by greater salience and 
polarization. Denmark has also seen fluctuations in polarization driven by abrupt changes in 
climate policy preferences on the centre-right (Eikeland and Inderberg 2016, Seeberg 2016). 
Applying Dalton’s (2008, p.906) Polarization Index (PI)2 to parties’ positions on two expert-
coded climate policy items from 2009 and 20143 supports the observation that parties are more 
polarized on climate policy in Denmark (PI = 3.7 and 3.4 in 2009 and 2014, respectively) than 
in Ireland (2.9 and 3.2). It is also reflected over a longer period in Carter et al.’s (2018) 
manifesto-based data on climate policy positions for the two main parties in each country: in 
Denmark, the mean gap between the two main parties’ positions from 1994 to 2015 was 2.3 
times as large as in Ireland from 1997 to 2011.  
Denmark and Ireland’s general similarities have provided a basis for several comparative case 
studies of economic policies (e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano 1990, Kluth and Lynggaard 2013, 
Campbell and Hall 2015). They are also similar in ways that bear on parties’ incentives and 
constraints in developing climate policy preferences. They are long-established parliamentary 
democracies with proportional representation electoral systems and few veto points; these 
systems and the parties in them are most likely to respond to the challenge of climate change 
mitigation (Christoff and Eckersley 2011, p.440, Lachapelle and Paterson 2013, p.549, Spoon 
                                                 
2 PI = SQRT{∑(party vote sharei)*([party positioni – party system average position]/5)2} where i is a party 
(Dalton 2008). 
3 The data were collected for two Europe-wide Voter Advice Applications (Trechsel and Mair 2011, Garzia et 
al. 2017). Responses ranged from ‘Strongly disagree’ to ‘Strongly agree’ on the following statements: ‘The 
promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing)’ and ‘Renewable sources 
of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy costs’. The 
Polarization Index values presented here are calculated using the aggregated values for these two items placed 
on a 0-10 scale. 
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et al. 2014). Both have been EU member states since 1973, accounting for an important set of 
supranational constraints and incentives for domestic climate policy actors. 
In terms of problem-pressure, both countries have high per capita emissions but relatively low 
vulnerability to climate change impacts (e.g., Eckstein et al. 2017). They have open economies 
and both have large, export-oriented agriculture sectors, which account for significant 
proportions of their GHG emissions: typically more than 30% in Ireland and approximately 
20% in Denmark. Nuclear energy has been off their respective political agendas for some time 
and both experienced a property market and banking crisis in the late 2000s, albeit only Ireland 
received a multilateral ‘bailout’ loan (Kluth and Lynggaard 2013, Campbell and Hall 2015). 
Despite their similarities, Denmark and Ireland differ in some important respects for the 
purposes of this study. First, Denmark’s party system is centred primarily on the left-right 
dimension, while Ireland’s party system is structured by two centrist parties in which both the 
left and the far right are relatively underdeveloped. Applied to expert survey and manifesto 
data on left-right positions (Bakker et al. 2015, Volkens et al. 2017), Dalton’s (2008) PI 
supports these observations, with consistently greater left-right polarization evident in 
Denmark than Ireland.4 This has implications for both party competition and for the intra-party 
politics of climate policy in the context of existing policy commitments. Second, they differ in 
the ubiquity and strength of parties claiming issue ownership on climate policy, with 
implications for party competition. In Denmark, the Socialist People’s Party, the Social 
Liberals, the Red-Green Alliance, the Conservative People’s Party, and since 2013 the 
Alternative, have all laid claim to being ‘green’ (Kosiara-Pedersen and Little 2016), while in 
Ireland political environmentalism is represented by a small Green Party. Third, climate change 
has been the subject of relatively little public concern in Ireland, while public concern has been 
                                                 
4 Denmark’s party system is also more fragmented than Ireland’s, but fragmentation appears to be unrelated to 
polarization (Dalton 2008, p. 908). 
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Figure 1).  
As similar cases, Ireland and Denmark allow us to focus on the roles of this set of factors in 
driving party preferences and ultimately generating cross-national differences in system-level 
climate politics. Although the countries differ in the configuration of climate policy preferences 
in their party systems and are diverse in their values for key causal factors, they are both typical 
cases of the expected relationship between left-right polarization and climate policy 
polarization and as such they lend themselves to the examination of mechanisms that underpin 
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Case study methods and in-depth interviews are appropriate for examining the mechanisms of 
interest. They potentially provide access to key actors’ motivations and perceptions, which are 
central to understanding their responses to the incentives and constraints of interest. They allow 
us to follow preferences amidst a shifting policy agenda, and to examine how the causal factors 
of interest – which are potentially complementary and may interact – act in conjunction with 
one another. 
We draw on a range of case study materials and the accounts of 22 individuals whom we 
interviewed between 2013 and 2016 (Table 1). Interviewees were selected because of their 
knowledge of individual parties (e.g., as elected representatives or advisers to ministers) or 
because of their knowledge of multiple parties on the climate policy issue (e.g., as 
representatives of NGOs or interest groups who lobbied the parties). The interviews focussed 
on the themes of office-, policy-, and vote-seeking incentives, and had a particular focus on 
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gathering information about the internal party politics of climate policy development. They 
were conducted on a non-attribution basis and were not recorded. Relative to the overall period 
of interest, the interview data were collected during a short period, so the information from 
these sources is biased towards the ten years immediately prior to the interviews. This 
imbalance is partly offset by the publication, after the passage of time, of scholarly and 
journalistic accounts of the earlier part of the period of interest. 
 




Danish climate politics has typically been characterised by left-of-centre parties asserting issue 
ownership of climate policy and centre-right parties adopting a minimally accommodative 
policy stance (Interviews 16, 17, 21). This structure of partisan preferences has persisted, with 
the exception of the late-2000s when the centre-right aimed to outdo the left bloc on climate 
policy (Carter et al. 2018, pp.735–736). It consists less of a conflict over the need for climate 
policy than over the prominence of state involvement as well as the degree of international 
climate leadership Denmark should provide. These partisan differences have developed in spite 
of an underlying consensus on energy security, including leadership on renewable energy 
technologies and energy efficiency, which was forged in response to the Oil Crises of the 1970s 
and renewed in the development of subsequent policies, such as Energy 2000 (1990) (Andersen 
and Nielsen 2016, p.94, Eikeland and Inderberg 2016, p.166). 
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Although climate change has not been a top policy area for public concern or party competition, 
it is considered part of the next tier of public attention, after health, jobs, and immigration 
(Kosiara-Pedersen 2008, Kosiara-Pedersen and Little 2016; Interview 16). Party attachment to 
climate policy is a party identity factor on the left and therefore parties on the left are expected 
to have more ambitious climate policy than parties on the right, even though traditional issues 
lead their campaigns. In addition to high public concern and the variety of potential issue-
owners, environmental NGOs have been active (Binderkrantz 2015, p.126, Andersen and 
Nielsen 2016, p.84), even providing the Social Liberal (SL) Minister for Climate and Energy 
from 2011 to 2015. Elements of Danish industry support ambitious Danish climate and energy 
policy, while traditional sectors such as agriculture have sided with the centre-right’s less 
ambitious approach (Interviews 20, 22).  
The Social Democrats’ (SD) ‘climate’ identity was driven in part by activism of former party 
leader Svend Auken on the left of the party in the 1990s (Interviews 14-19) and was 
substantiated by government policies, including the adoption of an ambitious target for the first 
Kyoto commitment period. Under Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (SD) in 1993, the 
Environment and Energy ministries were merged, with Auken appointed its first minister; the 
integration of these two ministries ‘created a synergy between the two policy fields which often 
have contradictory policy goals’ (Dyrhauge 2017, p.91). Together with SL, the Nyrup 
Rasmussen government consolidated Denmark’s position as a climate leader. While in 
opposition from 2001 to 2011, the parties of the centre-left, including the SLs, continued to 
maintain pressure on the Venstre-led government (Seeberg 2016). Following significant gains 
at the 2007 national election (+12 of the Folketing’s 179 seats), the Socialist People’s Party 
(SPP) signalled that it was ready to become a ‘party of government’, and together with SD 
developed a policy platform for the 2011 election in which climate and energy policy featured 
prominently (Interview 16). They aimed to outdo the government, including on its energy, 
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transport, taxation and ‘green growth’ policies, leading not only to increased salience, but also 
refusal to support some government policies on the grounds of insufficient ambition (Laub 
2012). While transitory, this competitive dynamic between the two main parties on climate 
policy was a powerful driver of party preferences (Seeberg 2016, Carter et al. 2018). The 
bargaining position of the SPP vis-à-vis SD, enhanced by its increased seat share, consolidated 
an ambitious climate policy position for the centre-left bloc.  
Under Anders Fogh Rasmussen from 1998 and in government with the Conservative People’s 
Party (CPP) from 2001 the centre-right Venstre prioritised industrial and agricultural interests 
and its climate policy was fitted into a neo-liberal framework; that is, the party promoted 
market-led developments rather than state-spending initiatives. In its first years in power, it 
highlighted conflict between climate policy and economic policy and its position entailed 
cutbacks on renewable energy projects, a retreat from leadership in the EU, and the 
appointment of the controversial Bjørn Lomborg to the new Environmental Assessment 
Institute (Andersen and Nielsen 2016, Eikeland and Inderberg 2016, Seeberg 2016). Fogh 
Rasmussen himself did not rank climate change as a priority issue, despite advice from his 
coalition partner to do so; he admitted as much at a 2008 party conference (Interview 14, 18). 
Venstre changed orientation in the mid-2000s while in government, heralding a period of 
renewed convergence and higher-salience competition on climate policy between left and right. 
The high level of activity globally on climate policy influenced domestic politics and this 
period of salience was extended by the prospect of Denmark hosting the UN Climate Change 
Conference in 2009. Intra-bloc dynamics of party competition help explain this shift: the junior 
coalition partner (the CPP) maintained and slightly expanded its number of parliamentary seats 
at the 2005 election and kept them in 2007, whereas Venstre had lost seats in 2005 and 2007. 
These changes altered the weight of the CPP within the government coalition – where its party 
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leader had continuously argued for a stronger climate policy (Interview 14), and thereby 
influenced government policy in a more active direction. Fogh Rasmussen appointed the 
popular Connie Hedegaard (CPP) as Environment Minister and established the environment as 
a ‘top-five’ priority; this was followed by the launch of a new energy policy in January 2007 
with broad political support, the establishment of a Ministry for Climate Change and Energy, 
and an energy policy agreement in 2008 (Andersen and Nielsen 2016, p.86, Eikeland and 
Inderberg 2016, Seeberg 2016, p.193). Developing Denmark’s export potential was a major 
plank in Hedegaard’s strategy and the about-turn in Venstre’s position was justified by Fogh 
Rasmussen as enhancing energy security. In addition, significant sections of Danish industry 
and local (including municipal and private) interests had applied pressure to return to 
supporting renewable and decentralised sources of energy; these interests had in turn been 
created by earlier energy policies (Interview 15; Eikeland and Inderberg 2016).  
From 2011 to 2015, the centre-left coalition maintained much of its climate policy ambition in 
government. Nonetheless, in straitened economic conditions, the SD finance minister presented 
the most significant intra-party obstacle to more ambitious policy, weighing short-term 
financial costs against longer-term investments (Interview 17) and the government reduced 
green taxes in an effort to increase economic growth (Andersen and Nielsen 2016, p.92). 
Climate change was recognised as an issue ‘owned’ by the government parties, but the coalition 
also recognised that more traditional issues commanded the public’s attention (Interview 16). 
Anticipating a departure from government after the 2015 election, the left focused its efforts 
on passing framework climate legislation (Interview 19).  
Venstre’s trajectory under Lars Løkke Rasmussen (from August 2009) was marked by 
retrenchment on climate policy and the prioritization of cost-cutting as a response to the 
economic crisis, leading to the re-establishment of clear differences between the parties. Both 
16 
 
Fogh Rasmussen and Hedegaard had departed Danish politics in 2009 for NATO and the 
European Commission, respectively, thereby removing the two main climate leaders of the late 
2000s from the centre-right. While Venstre entered into an agreement with the government on 
energy policy in 2012, it resisted elements of the government’s climate and energy plan during 
its formulation, and of the right-of-centre parties only the CPP supported proposed framework 
climate legislation in 2014 (Kosiara-Pedersen and Little 2016, p.558; Interview 18). Venstre 
maintained that sufficient progress had been made on climate policy to focus elsewhere, a 
position also supported by the agricultural lobby but not by the peak industry association 
(Interviews 20-22). When Venstre returned to office in 2015, it pursued a decidedly less 
ambitious climate and energy policy (Burck et al. 2017, p.19). The turnaround by Venstre is 
explained not only by the departure of Fogh Rasmussen and Hedegaard, but also by the 
electoral decline of the CPP, which suffered a significant loss of seats in the 2015 national 
election (-10), thereby easing the pressure on Venstre to maintain an ambitious climate 
mitigation policy. Venstre therefore depended all the more on parliamentary support from the 
Danish People’s Party (DPP), which was unenthusiastic about climate policy and more attuned 
to agricultural interests.  
 
Ireland, 1997-2016  
Ireland’s climate politics has been characterised by indistinct party preferences, especially 
between FF and FG (Interviews 2, 4, 7). The climate policy agenda has tended to focus on 
energy, on which there has been an absence of significant differences (Interview 8), and on 
agriculture, where a strong consensus has developed. This mainstream consensus was 
complemented by the absence of organised scepticism about climate science (Wagner and 
Payne 2017, p.23). Low public concern with climate change has led to perceptions among party 
elites that climate policy has very low electoral value, with one partial and brief exception in 
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2006-2007 (Interviews 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12). Further, environmental NGOs have been weak 
(Interviews 6, 10). Arguments concerning competitiveness have regularly been used to counter 
climate policy proposals, such as a carbon tax and quantitative GHG emissions targets (e.g., 
Coghlan 2007, Interview 4, 11). Ireland’s small size and irrelevance to the global problem of 
climate change is a theme that politicians across Fianna Fáil (FF), Fine Gael (FG), and Labour 
have aired at times (Interviews 5, 9). 
There was some low-salience competition on environmental policy at the 1997 election, but 
without a particular focus on climate change. FF government minister Noel Dempsey initiated 
a period of policy entrepreneurship and the government adopted a modest but higher-than-
expected target for the first Kyoto commitment period. This episode ended in 2004 with a 
failure to change FF’s position on the key issue of a carbon tax in the face of blocking coalitions 
between intra-party actors, ministries, the junior coalition partner (the small, economically 
liberal Progressive Democrats), and interest groups (Coghlan 2007, pp.138–140, Cunningham 
2008, pp.97–103, pp.146-151; Interviews 2, 5, 6, 8). Energy security concerns led the 
government to reject converting to gas Ireland’s coal-burning power station at Moneypoint and 
to justify continued subsidisation of peat-burning for electricity generation (Forfás 2006, 
Cunningham 2008).  
For a period of approximately nine months ahead of the May 2007 general election, the FF 
leadership sought to put climate change and the environment higher on its agenda, albeit this 
was not matched by positional changes on key issues such as carbon taxation or their plan to 
rely heavily on the purchase of carbon credits to meet Kyoto targets. There were at least three 
motivations for raising the salience of climate policy: competition with the Greens, who were 
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Figure 1), especially in key constituencies; and coalitional considerations, including increasing 
perceived compatibility with the Greens (Interview 5). Relatively high public concern was also 
recognised by candidates across several of the smaller, Dublin-centred parties who came to see 
it as a ‘vote winner’ (Interviews 2, 10, 11; Cunningham 2008, p.106). When FF and the PDs 
entered government with the Greens in 2007, they effectively delegated aspects of climate 
policy to them (Interview 6). However, they also delayed the implementation of some 
important measures such as a carbon tax until it became necessary for revenue-raising reasons 
during the economic crisis. Their reluctance was at least partly due to the public’s low 
willingness to pay the proposed tax (Cunningham 2008, p.317; European Commission 2018: 
Special EB 300 and 322).  
In opposition, FG did not make comparable efforts to emphasise climate policy. Internal policy 
entrepreneurship by Simon Coveney up to 2007 failed to convince the party of the merits of a 
carbon tax (Interviews 5, 6, 7). Although FG faced some of the same electoral incentives as 
FF, they had fewer reasons to improve their compatibility with the Greens, given the smaller 
party’s clear preference for a FG-led coalition (Interviews 3, 5, 8). Labour also opposed a 
carbon tax due to concerns about costs for commuters and fuel poverty (Interview 11). With 
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the Green Party’s entry into government in 2007, Labour quickly sought to increase its focus 
on climate policy as a means of criticising the government while competing with its small but 
significant rival for middle-class votes, and driven by policy entrepreneurship of individuals 
such as its energy spokesperson Liz McManus (Little 2017a). 
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Figure 1). The 2011 FF manifesto, published shortly after Ireland entered a multi-lateral 
‘bailout’ programme, focused exclusively on jobs, growth and competitiveness, as did the FG 
agenda in government thereafter (Interview 5). Both main parties opposed the inclusion of 
binding GHG emissions targets in a new framework climate law (enacted in 2015) and 
important elements of climate policy were de-prioritized during the crisis (Little 2017b). In 
government, FG not only opposed unilateral targets for Ireland, but also effectively disowned 
its EU emissions targets for 2020, blaming Ireland’s failure to meet them on the unrealistic 
ambition of the previous government and reduced investment during the crisis. With no Green 
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Party representation in parliament from 2011 to 2016, the junior coalition partner (Labour) 
helped to keep the issue of climate change on the political agenda (Interviews 9, 11). 
The crisis increased the importance of economic sectors that could contribute to export-led 
growth and coincided with the strengthening and development of the cross-party consensus on 
agriculture, buttressed by industry-led national strategies for the sector. Although climate 
change was of particularly low salience among farmers in the 2000s, this changed in the 2010s 
(Interview 12), beginning with the activation of an IFA campaign against the Green Party’s 
Climate Bill, which led to FF candidates fearing being ‘outflanked’ by FG on agriculture in 
rural constituencies (Interview 3). While in 2000, the FF-led government could envisage 
‘livestock reductions’ as part of the first National Climate Change Strategy (NCCS 2000), by 
the 2011 general election the four main parties agreed that climate policy should not interfere 
with ambitious expansion plans for meat and dairy production, effectively putting this question 
outside the bounds of ‘reasonable politics’ (Interviews 9, 12). The decision of the Labour Party, 
notably, to cleave to this consensus was a tactical one motivated by electoral and intra-party 
considerations (Interview 11).  
Against this backdrop, the adoption of climate change legislation proposed by the FG/Labour 
government in 2015 was driven in part by Labour Party supporters’ expectations of 
achievements on climate policy and by Labour’s need to make good on its criticisms of the 
Green Party in government (Little 2017a, Torney 2017, Interviews 5, 11). The party’s values, 
such as social justice and global responsibility, also help to explain why several Labour 
politicians engaged actively with the issue (Interview 11, 12).  
Ireland’s electoral system and political culture place a premium on local issues which, after 
2010, provided a context for increased public concern about the local impact of various climate 
policies. Energy infrastructure (wind turbines and pylons) became a very significant issue 
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across the main parties due to localized mobilization (Interviews 2, 6, 9, 11, 12),  sometimes 
manifesting in intra-coalition and intra-party disputes (e.g., within the Labour Party on wind 
turbine setback distances and within both the coalition and FG on the North-South 
Interconnector) (Interviews 4, 9, 11). Another salient localised issue was the protection of peat 
bogs (which are important carbon sinks) at the expense of turf-cutting. Together with 
agriculture policy, these issues meant that parties’ dependence on rural votes became 
increasingly associated with their positions on climate change. This dependence was greatest 
for the two main parties, but was also high for Sinn Féin and for Labour after its success in 
winning seats outside the main cities in 2011 (Interview 11). 
 
Discussion 
The causal factors of interest – public opinion, party competition, and existing policy 
commitments – frequently worked in conjunction with one another; nonetheless, in this section, 
we summarise and specify their roles. Public opinion was an important part of the context in 
which parties – especially mainstream parties – formed their policy preferences. In 2006-2008, 
the peak in public opinion in each country increased incentives for mainstream parties such as 
FF and Venstre to raise the salience of climate change and, in the case of Venstre, to develop 
‘greener’ positions on climate policy, despite the second-order nature of climate policy as an 
issue. In the case of Ireland, low public concern was the reason interviewees most frequently 
cited to explain why politicians and their parties did not pay more attention to the issue.  
The uneven distribution of public opinion across parties’ potential support bases influenced 
their climate policy preferences and was in turn associated with left-right preferences. Party 
elites to the left-of-centre in both countries were aware that their supporters gave some priority 
to climate policy. Public opinion has also been mediated by institutions: in Ireland since 
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approximately 2010, localised public opinion, in conjunction with constituency-specific 
competition among the main parties, has increasingly been a constraint on those parties’ 
climate policy preferences in relation to various rural climate policy issues. While this is not a 
feature of Danish climate politics, there are comparable instances elsewhere (Stokes 2016). 
The urban-rural divide that these conflicts trace helps to explain some of the left-right 
differences that exist on climate policy.  
We observe the power of mainstream party competition on climate policy in both directions. 
When the left bloc in Denmark increased their challenge to the right-of-centre government in 
the late 2000s, in the presence of policy entrepreneurship by the CPP and with the prospect of 
the Copenhagen Summit, there was powerful and short-lived competition between the main 
parties on climate policy. This did not take off in Ireland, partly due to a lack of credibility in 
FF’s attempts to ‘green’ its image in 2007. What we do observe, however, is powerful 
competition between mainstream parties to oppose localised climate policies. 
While we cannot resolve contradictory findings arising from broader cross-national studies on 
the role of issue owners, we have detected party preference changes motivated by strategies of 
accommodation found by Spoon et al (2014). In Denmark, the SPP and CPP both influenced 
their respective blocs as they became larger in the 2000s; the Irish Greens most influenced 
other parties’ preferences when they seemed likely to perform strongly in 2007. As expected, 
this competition has had uneven effects, with the greatest impact of competition from issue-
owners on other left-of-centre parties. However, the Danish case also shows issue ownership 
and accommodation on the centre-right in the late 2000s when the CPP gained strength, as well 
as limited accommodation by FF of Green Party preferences in Ireland. Meanwhile, the DPP 
has acted as a competitive constraint on the Danish centre-right. Beyond electoral competition, 
concerns about coalitional considerations have also come into play when mainstream parties 
have perceived the need to develop their compatibility with issue-owners.  
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There is extensive evidence in our case studies that existing policy preferences influenced 
parties’ climate policy preferences. These existing preferences were in turn rooted in members’ 
expectations, which pushed parties of the left in particular to display a degree of ownership 
over the issue. In Denmark, state intervention was a major issue related to climate policy, while 
Venstre’s neoliberal outlook in the late 1990s and early 2000s precluded certain climate policy 
positions. Likewise, the centre-right framed its turn to climate policy in the late 2000s in terms 
that resonated with its values, such as increasing exports and increasing energy security. For 
the centre-right parties in Ireland, competitiveness has been to the fore in arguments against 
climate policies, and energy security concerns have been used to justify both the continued use 
of fossil fuels and the development of renewable sources of energy. Economic policy 
preferences were prominent among the most influential existing policy preferences, suggesting 
that the ‘economy vs climate’ dimension remains relevant.  
However, it is not simply the case that the left provided a context conducive to climate policy 
preference development while the right did not. In Denmark and Ireland, existing priorities of 
growth, financial stability, and social cohesion often trumped climate policy across the political 
spectrum, not least during the economic crisis. While the Irish Labour Party’s support for 
climate policy was rooted in its broader values such as social justice and global responsibility, 
it also opposed the carbon tax due to concerns about fuel poverty and general consumer costs. 
The crisis also contributed to reshaping policy and party preferences on the left and right 
concerning Ireland’s largest-emitting sector, agriculture, thus profoundly influencing climate 
politics. Indeed, evidence of the profound effects of the crisis on parties’ preferences in both 
countries is striking (cf. Rohrschneider and Miles 2015). 
The case studies also show that intra-party policy entrepreneurs sometimes have a key role in 
the formation of party preferences: Auken (SD), Hedegaard (CPP) and McManus (Labour). 
However, their success is not guaranteed, and these entrepreneurs had the greatest chance of 
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success in influencing their own parties’ policies in a context in which their initiatives 
coincided with other party goals (Little 2017a). 
One other factor arising empirically from the case studies is that interest groups have evidently 
played a key role in shaping party preferences. The preferences of ostensibly similar interest 
groups vary, however, and the cases of Denmark and Ireland illustrate this quite clearly: the 
degree of support for climate policy from the main business interests differed across these 
contexts. However, agricultural interests remain a constraint on climate policy in both 
countries, consistent with the idea that sectors with high costs of mitigation will be most 
opposed to climate policy (Michaelowa 2000, Christoff and Eckersley 2011, p.442, Wagner 
and Ylä-Anttila 2018).  
Overall, it is striking that in Denmark, where there is higher public concern, more competition 
from issue-owners, and a greater share of parties with left-of-centre preferences, this has not 
led to a uniformly ‘greener’ set of parties; rather, it has led to polarization at times, further 
indicating the positional, contentious nature of climate policies (Farstad 2018, p.705). 
Curiously, the comparison of Denmark and Ireland does not fully support the widely-held view 
that partisan polarization of climate policy preferences is detrimental to climate policy: overall, 
Denmark has produced stronger climate leadership than Ireland over the period studied, despite 
being more polarized. This may be explained by an underlying consensus rooted in pre-existing 
policies: specifically, the aim of becoming a leader in energy technologies that developed after 
the Oil Crises, creating new constituencies of interest (Eikeland and Inderberg 2016). 
Nonetheless, when polarization has intensified in Denmark and the right has been in power, it 
has had an impact, as witnessed by its recent slide from a position of climate leadership (Burck 





Climate policy’s characteristics make it an unusual and difficult issue for domestic political 
actors: it is cross-sectoral, it addresses a global problem, and it is associated with diffuse, 
distant benefits and concentrated costs. In the world of party politics, however, it also has much 
in common with other issues. When forming their climate policy preferences, parties respond 
to public opinion, they accommodate successful issue-owners, and they do not develop climate 
policies on a blank slate: they are constrained and facilitated by their existing policy 
preferences. The uneven effects of these factors across political parties help to explain 
differential responses observed across the left-right spectrum in many contexts. Given the 
centrality of political parties to policymaking, these findings have practical implications for 
climate policy practitioners. 
While countries evidently vary in their climate politics, we might expect these mechanisms to 
be at work in other cases, at least in those typical of the relationship between left-right 
preferences and climate policy preferences. The strong role of pre-existing preferences may 
also be generalizable to party policies on other ‘new’ issues, as they are moulded to shape 
existing worldviews and policy commitments.  
Our study has contributed to broadening and deepening the evidence-base on the drivers of 
parties’ climate policy preferences. It has drawn on accounts of party elites’ perceptions and 
motivations in responding to a set of factors that are important drivers of parties’ climate policy 
preferences. It feeds into the growing body of knowledge on parties’ climate policy preferences 
and comparative climate politics more generally, yet it also points to gaps in our knowledge.  
The relationship between public opinion and party preferences still requires broad, 
crossnational studies that connect public opinion and parties, not least in Europe 
(Marcinkiewicz and Tosun 2015, p.201). Our analysis focuses on party competition and climate 
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policy preferences and in doing so it has highlighted the important role of mainstream party 
competition both as a catalyst for ‘greener’ climate policy preferences, but also as a constraint 
on party preferences. On intra-party factors, we show that existing preferences associated with 
traditional left-right politics matter for the policies that parties adopt and for the ways in which 
they frame them. Furthering the study of these lines of enquiry with broader, systematic 
comparative studies will require building on recent studies (e.g., Carter et al. 2018, Farstad 
2018) to develop more comprehensive and widely-applied measures of parties’ climate policy 
preferences, especially of their positions on climate policy. Further, climate policy provides 
one cross-sectoral window through which relationships between party politics and interest 
groups can be viewed, expanding our knowledge of this key set of relationships (Binderkrantz 
2014, p.535, 2015, p.121). 
Finally, our study highlights common drivers of climate policy preferences across two national 
contexts, but also suggests considerable diversity in the climate politics of small states. 
Characteristics that can most directly be related to state smallness – for example, perceptions 
that small size makes a country irrelevant to the problem of climate change – appear not to be 
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Figure 1. Public concern about climate change. (Source: European Commission 2018)
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Table 1. Overview of interviews 
 Interview no.   Role Month Location  
      
Ireland 1 Think tank representative November 2014 Dublin  
 2 NGO representative December 2014 Dublin  
 3 Political adviser December 2014 Dublin  
 4 Interest group representative January 2015 Dublin  
 5 Political adviser July 2015 Dublin  
 6 Political adviser July 2015 Dublin  
 7 Elected representative June 2016 Dublin  
 8 Political adviser June 2016 Dublin  
 9 NGO representative June 2016 Dublin  
 10 Elected representative June 2016 Dublin  
 11 Political adviser June 2016 Dublin  
 12 Interest group representative June 2016 Dublin  
      
Denmark 13 Elected representative October 2013 Brussels  
 14 Party leader 
 





 15 NGO representative January 2014 Copenhagen  
 
No  No     
 
 16 Elected representative January 2014 Copenhagen  
 
 
 17 Elected representative January 2014 Copenhagen  
 18 Elected representative January 2014 Copenhagen  
 19 Cabinet minister 
Cabinet minister 




 20 Interest group representative January 2014 Copenhagen  
 21 Party staff March 2014 Phone 
interview 
 
 22 Interest group representative May 2014 Email   
 
* Where the interviewee has held multiple relevant roles, we highlight the role that was 
most relevant for the purpose of this study.  
 
 
